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Abstract At all is among the most common negative polarity items in English.
In this paper, I argue that at all has a dual use as a degree modifier and operator
on the common ground. I first present an account of degree modifier at all based
on Chierchia 2013 that captures its status as a minimizer as well as an NPI. I then
show that a very similar account can be used for at all’s common ground usage,
departing from the usual quantification over worlds approach for common ground
management. This degree-based account of common ground at all captures its status
as an NPI and provides a possible shared semantic core between degree modifiers
and common ground operators.
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1 The NPI at all and a distributional puzzle
At all is an English negative polarity item (NPI) with a puzzling distribution. While
at first glance at all patterns quite like both weak NPIs and minimizers, this paper
presents the hypothesis that it in fact has two distinct uses: one as a degree modifier,
and the other as a common ground operator.
I argue that, when at all modifies gradable predicates and verbs, it is a minimizer
degree modifier of gradable predicates like determined and competent.
(1) I doubt that Emily is at all determined.
(2) It’s unlikely that the math tutor is at all competent.
Intuitively, (1) above means something like: I doubt that Emily has even a very
small amount of determination. At all’s contribution seems to lower the threshold
of determination that Emily possesses, which in turn generates a sentence that is
particularly emphatic. Here, at all acts as a minimizer NPI. Minimizers are NPIs
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that refer to a vary small degree on a scale, but their use in negative or downward
entailing (DE) environments leads to an expression that is particularly emphatic
(Israel 2001). They include expressions like remotely, give a damn, and the least
bit. While at all is attested in a wide range of DE environments, like the weak NPIs
any and ever, its distribution also has substantial overlap with that of the minimizer
remotely (Hoeksema 2012).
If at all is indeed acting as a degree modifier of gradable predicates, it should
be degraded with non-gradable predicates unless they are coerced into a gradable
meaning. Indeed, this seems to be the case. The following examples show that at all
is odd with the non-gradable adjectives boiling and dead.
(3) ?I doubt that the water is at all boiling.
(4) ?I don’t think Emily is at all dead.
So far, at all looks like a run-of-the-mill degree modifier: acceptable when
it modifies gradable predicates and unacceptable when it modifies non-gradable
predicates. However, there is a puzzle. While at all is odd when it precedes a
non-gradable predicate, it is perfectly acceptable when it follows a non-gradable
predicate:
(5) I doubt that the water is boiling at all.
(6) I don’t think Emily is dead at all.
The generalization, then, is that at all can either precede or follow gradable pred-
icates, but it can only follow non-gradable predicates. To confirm this distribution,
I conducted a corpus study with COCA (Davies 2008). I first generated a list of
non-gradable adjectives: wooden, locked, hand-made, married, single, dead, alive,
living, and vegetarian. These nine non-gradable adjectives were roughly matched
for ngram frequency with a set of nine gradable adjectives: competent, determined,
hesitant, consistent, frightened, tired, happy, concerned, and ambitious. For each
adjective, I searched COCA for two search strings: one with at all preceding the
adjective, and the other with at all following the adjective. For example, for the
adjective married, I searched for the strings at all married and married at all. I then
recorded the number of uses of each string. Sentences were included only if the
gradable adjective was paired with the verb to be (is, was, isn’t, wasn’t, etc.) rather
than another verb to control for possible interactions between at all and verbs, some
of which might be gradable.
For the non-gradable adjectives wooden, locked, hand-made, single, and vegetar-
ian, there were no results for either search string (with at all preceding or following
the adjective). Therefore, only the adjectives married, dead, alive, living, and preg-






















Table 1 Results of corpus study
adjective determined, so this was excluded as well. Table 1 summarizes the corpus
study’s results.
The results show that while at all is quite acceptable either following or preceding
gradable predicates, it is only acceptable when it follows non-gradable predicates.
Not only were these results significant (p < 0.00001 in a Fisher’s Exact Test), but
they were also quite categorical, with not a single instance of at all preceding a
non-gradable adjectives for the adjectives in the study.
In this paper, I argue that this distributional puzzle is due to the fact that at all has
two distinct uses: one as a degree modifier, and the other as a common ground (CG)
operator. Degree modifier at all modifies gradable predicates and means something
like the least bit: it suggests that the gradable predicate’s property is expressed to an
extremely low degree. At all’s other use, which I call common ground at all or CG
at all, modifies propositions rather than predicates. Informally, the addition of CG at
all signals that a proposition that is already in the CG should be removed according
to a perspective holder.
Like many accounts of discourse structure, my account is built on assumptions
about the common ground outlined in Stalnaker 1978. According to Stalnaker,
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the common ground of participants in a conversation involves the common, shared
knowledge that the discourse participants assume for the purposes of a conversation.
The common ground involves a set of propositions that are, in some sense, taken for
granted by the participants in a discourse.
(7) and (8) illustrate at all’s common ground usage. In each target sentence, at
all follows the non-gradable predicate married.
(7) Jessica: I wonder when Paul and Sophie got married.
Emily: Actually, Paul and Sophie aren’t married at all.
(8) Jessica: Emily, are any of our friends married? I know that George and Elise
are a couple, and I think Paul and Sophie are a couple too.
Emily: Well, Paul and Sophie aren’t married (#at all).
In (7), Jessica assumes that the proposition Paul and Sophie are married is true
and that it is in the common ground. Emily then corrects her assumption. Here, at
all is perfectly acceptable with the non-gradable predicate married. In (8), on the
other hand, Jessica has no assumption that Paul and Sophie are married. Instead,
she asks Emily a neutral, information-seeking question about which students are
married. Here, it is unacceptable for Emily to respond with at all.
I argue that at all appears to be acceptable with non-gradable predicates in
sentences like those above because it does not directly modify these predicates at all.
Instead, it modifies entire propositions that may or may not contain non-gradable
predicates. Very informally, at all’s contribution suggests that these propositions
were incorrectly taken for granted in the common ground.
Although CG at all modifies propositions, it remains an NPI that must be
embedded in a DE environment. It must, therefore, attach below negation or another
DE operator. The proposition it picks out is the core affirmative proposition, which
must scope under sentential negation, a question, a conditional, or another DE
operator. The following example shows where at all attaches for sentential negation,
as well as its very informal, preliminary semantic contribution.
(9) Paul and Sophie aren’t married at all.
LF: NEG [[Paul and Sophie are married] at all]
Informal contribution of at all: Paul and Sophie are married was incorrectly
taken for granted in the discourse (according to the speaker).
In fact, at all is far from the only expression that serves this dual purpose. In
English, for example, the expressions really and totally can both act as modifiers of
scalar predicates and as operators on the common ground (Romero & Han 2004;
Beltrama 2018). In this paper, I first provide an account of at all as a degree
modifier, followed by an account of at all as a CG operator. In doing so, I explore
and incorporate a shared semantic core between degree modifiers and CG operators.
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2 At all as a degree modifier
If at all were not a negative polarity item, its use as a degree modifier could be
captured straightforwardly using the Kennedy & McNally 2005 framework for
degree modifiers and gradable adjectives. In this section, I provide an account
of at all’s semantics while temporarily putting aside its status as an NPI, treating
it as a polarity-insensitive minimizer and degree modifier. I then build on this
polarity-insensitive at all to account for its polarity sensitivity.
The following is a (somewhat simplified) denotation for the degree modifier very
from Kennedy & McNally 2002:
(10) [[very]] = λG<d,<e,t>>. λx . ∃d. [high(d) ∧ G(d)(x)]
In this denotation, very first takes a gradable predicate, G, of type <d, <e,t>>. It
then takes an entity x. Kennedy & McNally’s lexical entry states that there exists
some degree d that is high on the scale of degrees. Here, high means that, in the
current context, the degree is greater than the standard by a large degree. The
function then feeds this very high degree d to the gradable adjective G, allowing G’s
degree argument to be “set” to a very high value.
A “first-draft” lexical entry for at all might be very similar to the lexical entry of
very, but with a degree that is very low on the scale instead of very high.
(11) [[(polarity-insensitive) at all]] = λG<d,<e,t>>. λx. ∃d [verylow(d)∧G(d)(x)]
Defining at all as a degree modifier that takes a gradable predicate and sets its
degree argument to a very low degree captures at all’s status as a minimizer and
correctly predicts its meaning in DE environments. To illustrate this, consider the
following sentence:
(12) Emily isn’t at all competent.
I assume that competent is a gradable adjective with the following denotation:
(13) [[competent]] = λd. λx. competence(x) ≥ d
With these pieces in place, the truth conditions for (12) are the following:
(14) ¬ ∃d [verylow(d) ∧ competence(Emily) ≥ d]
This denotation states that there does not exist a degree d such that d is very
low and Emily’s competence is greater than or equal to d. In other words, Emily’s
competence must be lower than even a very low degree on the scale of competence.
However, with this polarity-insensitive denotation for at all, nothing prevents
at all from occurring in upward entailing (UE) environments. We predict, then,




(15) #Emily is at all competent.
Under this denotation of at all, the truth conditions of a sentence like (15) are
quite weak, sating that Emily has at least a very small degree of competence. Still,
this meaning is coherent, and the fact that this denotation does not exclude at all
from UE environments demonstrates that it should be modified.
2.1 Adapting Chierchia’s (2013) approach to at all
In this section, I use Chierchia (2013)’s framework to account for at all’s status as an
NPI. With Chierchia’s machinery, at all will generate a contradiction when it occurs
in UE, but not DE, environments. To do this, we need three steps: 1) allow at all to
set its gradable predicate’s degree to one that is extremely low; 2) add an obligatory
covert even operator that exhaustifies over any alternatives; and 3) add an obligatory
set of alternatives that set at all’s gradable predicate to higher degrees.
The first step to adapt Chierchia’s approach to NPIs to at all is to set at all’s
gradable predicate to an extremely low degree. In the polarity-insensitive version of
at all given above, this is done arbitrarily. However, Chierchia (2013) offers a much
more formal approach to defining this very low degree, and this approach can be
adapted to degree modifier at all.
Chierchia’s account involves the NPI give a damn, which sets an individual’s
degree of caring to dmin. Dmin provides a way to formalize an extremely low degree
on the scale of caring. The challenge that at all presents is that it can modify
any gradable predicate that refers to any scale, not simply caring, so dmin must be
defined in relation to at all’s gradable predicate argument. For at all, dmin must be
parameterized to whatever gradable adjective or verb at all modifies.
To account for this, I define a function called MinDegree that takes as its argu-
ment any gradable predicate G of type <d, <e,t>> and returns a very small degree:
(16) MinDegree<<d,<e,t>>,d> = λG. MAX {dminset : dminset < MIN ({d: ∃w’ ∈
ACCw. ∃x. G(d)(x) in w’ ∧ ∀d’ [G(d’)(x)→ d’ ≤ d]})}
We can show how MinDegree works when it takes a gradable predicate like
competent as its argument.
(17) MinDegree<<d,<e,t>>,d> = MAX {dminset : dminset < MIN ({d: ∃w’ ∈ ACCw.
∃x. competence(x) ≥ d in w’ ∧ ∀d’ [competence(x) ≥ d’→ d’ ≤ d]})}
In the bolded portion in (17) above, MinDegree generates a set of degrees. This
set is composed of degrees d that meet two criteria. The first criteria is that for
some world w’ in the set of accessible worlds, for some individual x, x’s degree of
competence in w’ is greater than or equal to d. In other words, there must be some
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individual (in any world) who actually expresses a degree of competence d. The
second criteria is that for all degrees d’, if the individual x’s competence is d’, then d’
must be less than or equal to d. This particular criteria is necessary because, in this
system, expressing a predicate to a particular degree d entails also expressing it to all
lower degrees as well. Without this second criteria, the set of degrees would include
not only maximal degrees of competence, but also all other non-maximal degrees of
competence that an individual expresses, including extremely small degrees. This
criteria means that d is the highest degree to which x’s competence is expressed, and
no smaller degrees are included.
Next, the MinDegree function takes the minimum degree from this set. Infor-
mally, this minimum degree is the lowest degree of competence that any individual in
any possible world expresses without also expressing higher degrees of competence.
In order to generate an impossibly small degree of competence dmin, such that
no individual can be competent only to degree dmin, we need to pick out a degree
that is even smaller than this minimum possible degree. To do this, the function
MinDegree then defines a set of degrees dminset such that dminset is lower than the
minimum possible degree, underlined in (17) above.
We are now left with a set of degrees that are “impossibly small” degrees of
competence: no individual in any world expresses competence to such a low degree
without also expressing it to higher degrees. In order for at all to set its gradable
predicate’s degree modifier to one specific degree, however, we need to pick out
one unique degree from this set. Any of the degrees in the set would work for this
purpose, since all of them are impossibly small. For simplicity, MinDegree selects
the maximum degree among the set. This maximum degree returned by MinDegree
is dmin.
With these pieces in place, the denotation for at all can be refined.
(18) [[degree modifier at all]] = λG<d,<e,t>>. λx. G(dmin)(x)
Where dmin = MinDegree(G)
With at all’s denotation refined to include dmin, the second step is to add an
obligatory covert even operator that must accompany degree modifier at all. I assume
that this even operator attaches high in the structure, scoping above the other material
in the sentence. The even operator is defined as follows (from Chierchia 2013):
(19) EALT (p) = p ∧ ∀q ∈ ALT [p <µ q]
where ‘p <µ q’ says that p is less likely than q with respect to some contextu-
ally relevant probability measure µ .
This covert even operator states that the original proposition p must be true in
the first conjunct. The second conjunct states that for all propositions q in the set
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of alternatives, the original proposition p is less likely than q with respect to some
contextually relevant probability measure.
The even operator derives at all’s distribution as an NPI in concert with a set
of obligatory alternatives. The third step is to define these alternatives so that
they generate the correct pattern in UE and DE environments. To do this, at all’s
alternatives set the degree to which the gradable predicate is expressed to greater
than or equal to dmin:
(20) [[ALT at all G]] = {λG<d,<e,t>>. λx. G(d’)(x): d’ ≥ dmin}
This derives a contradiction in UE environments. In UE environments, all of
at all’s alternatives will be stronger and less likely than the original proposition.
This is because in each alternative, the gradable predicate degree argument is set as
greater than or equal to a higher degree than in the original proposition. If a gradable
predicate is expressed to a high degree, this entails that it is also expressed to a
medium degree, a low degree, an extremely low degree, and so on. Because all of at
all’s alternatives are less likely than its original proposition in UE environments, the
covert even operator’s requirement is false.
There is, however, a problem here, one that is unique to at all as a degree
modifier. The problem lies in defining dmin, and more specifically, in the fact that
dmin is parameterized to be the minimum degree for a particular gradable predicate.
In order for the alternatives to set a gradable predicate’s degree argument to greater
than dmin, we need to define dmin. In order to define dmin, we need to know the
gradable predicate in question, since the function that derives dmin takes this gradable
predicate as its argument. The rule that defines the set—d’ ≥ dmin—is outside the
scope of the gradable predicate argument. Therefore, with this definition, there is no
way to use the specific gradable predicate as an argument for dmin, and therefore no
way to define dmin with respect to a particular gradable predicate.
There are two ways to deal with this problem. One is to use something more
generic than dmin. Instead of dmin, at all’s alternatives might refer to a more generic
degree that is simply characterized as “very low.” All of at all’s alternatives will set
their gradable predicate to degrees that are higher than “very low”:
(21) [[ALT at all]] = {λG<d,<e,t>>. λx. G(d)(x) : ∃d’ [very-low(d’) ∧ d ≥ d’]}
In affirmative or UE environments, alternatives in which the gradable predicate’s
degree is set to higher than very-low will all lead to semantically stronger propositions
that entail the original. This makes the even operator’s second conjunct false in all
UE environments, generating a contradiction. In DE environments, alternatives in
which the gradable predicate’s degree is set to higher than dmin will all lead to more
likely and semantically weaker propositions that are entailed by the original. All of
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these alternatives are compatible with the covert even operator’s requirements, and
there is no contradiction.
For the sake of consistency across the original denotation and the alternatives,
however, it might be preferable to refer to dmin in both. Below, I provide an alternative
denotation that achieves this using a syncategorematic rule. This rule defines at all’s
alternatives for both at all and its specific gradable predicate argument. Without
the gradable predicate argument, dmin cannot be parameterized to that particular
gradable predicate’s scale.
(22) [[ALT at all G]] = {[λG<d,<e,t>>. λx. G(d’)(x)] : d’ ≥ dmin}(G)
Where dmin = MinDegree(G)
In this denotation, dmin is defined in the exact same way as described above for
at all’s original proposition. The only difference is that the alternatives are now
defined for at all with its gradable predicate, so that the gradable predicate can in
turn be an argument in dmin.
To put these pieces together, I will show how this account of degree modifier at
all works with the following sentence:
(23) Emily isn’t at all competent.
LF: [(covert) even [¬ [Emily is [at all [competent]]]]]
Assuming the denotation for competent in (13), the truth conditions of (23) are
the following (excluding the contribution of the covert even operator):
(24) ¬ [competence(Emily) ≥ dmin]
Where dmin = MinDegree(G)
Paraphrase: It’s not the case that Emily’s degree of competence is greater
than or equal to dmin.
Next, at all introduces a set of alternatives. Below, I show what these alternatives
look like for the syncategorematic approach; the very low version is exactly the
same, but with a very low degree instead of dmin.
(25) {¬ [competence(Emily) ≥ d’] : d’ ≥ dmin}
Where dmin = MinDegree(G)
Finally, the covert even operator, which sits at the top of the structure, applies
to the alternatives. As described earlier, these alternatives will all be semantically
weaker than the original proposition, because at all occurs in a DE environment. This
satisfies even’s requirement. However, in affirmative sentences, all of the alternatives
are semantically stronger than the original proposition, so the covert even operator
will always output false—leading to a contradiction.
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3 Common ground at all
The denotation sketched above for at all works only when at all is used as a degree
modifier of gradable predicates. However, as discussed above, at all can also modify
entire propositions, and it has a more restricted set of licit syntactic positions when it
does so. This version of at all, which I’ll call CG at all, suggests that the proposition
it modifies is already in the common ground. The following examples illustrate this
version of at all with the non-gradable predicate handmade.
(26) Emily: Hey, can you tell us about these garden gnomes? Are they handmade?
Shopkeeper: Sure! They’re not handmade (#at all), but they’re still cute.
(27) Emily: I love these garden gnomes. Whoever made them must be talented.
Shopkeeper: Actually, the garden gnomes aren’t handmade at all. But they’re
still cute.
In (26), the proposition They are handmade is not assumed by Emily, and is not
taken for granted in the CG, so at all is not acceptable. In (27), on the other hand,
Emily does assume that the gnomes are handmade, and so at all is now acceptable.
Because this version of at all is an NPI and must be embedded under a DE opera-
tor, the proposition in question is usually being negated, questioned, or challenged in
the sentence overall. The resulting meaning, then, of CG at all is that a proposition
was incorrectly taken for granted in the conversation’s common ground.
3.1 The quantification-over-worlds approach
At all is far from the only degree modifier that has a dual function as a CG oper-
ator. Other particles that show a similar dual function include the English really
(Romero & Han 2004); English totally (Beltrama 2018); informal uses of so and
one hundred percent; and French vraiment. Despite these crosslinguistic patterns,
degree modifiers and CG operators are not usually accounted for in the same way or
using similar machinery. Degree modifiers modify the degree arguments of gradable
predicates that correspond to scales. CG operators, on the other hand, are not gener-
ally accounted for with degrees; instead, they are captured using quantification over
worlds in which a discourse participant’s goals are met.
In fact, this traditional account can be adapted reasonably well to account for
at all. Here, I adapt Frana & Rawlins’s (2019) account of the Italian particle mica,
a CG management operator, to fit at all.1 Their account builds on previous work
1 One key difference between mica and at all is that mica itself contributes a negative meaning, while
at all does not. In Frana & Rawlins’s account, mica is bundled with sentential negation; its truth
conditions negate its proposition. In at all’s case, the DE operators that license at all provide the
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on CG management and both VERUM and FALSUM operators, including Romero &
Han 2004, Romero (2015), and Repp (2013).
The presupposition at all contributes can be captured with the same presupposi-
tion that Frana & Rawlins (2019) provide for mica:
(28) [[at all]]c,w = λp. p
Defined for p, c,w only if ∀w’ ∈ Epix(w): (∀w” ∈ Convx(w’) : (p /∈ CGw′′))
Here, Convx(w’) is the set of worlds in which an attitude holder x’s conversational
goals are met, and Epix(w) is the set of worlds that conform to the attitude holder x’s
knowledge in w. This discourse condition states that for all worlds w’ in the set of
worlds that conform to an attitude holder x’s knowledge in w, for all worlds w” in
which the attitude holder’s conversational goals are met, the proposition p is not in
the CG in w”.
I assume that in declaratives, x is anchored to the speaker or, in embedded
contexts, to the attitude holder. So in a sentence like The chair isn’t handmade at
all, x is anchored to the speaker; in a sentence like Emily doesn’t think that the chair
is handmade at all, x is anchored to Emily.
3.2 Meta-conversational implicature
One important feature of this account of at all is that it does not overtly require the
proposition at all modifies to be in the CG already. Instead, it states that a perspective
holder believes that a proposition should not be in the CG. Yet, intuitively, this is a
core contribution of at all, which cannot be uttered unless the proposition it modifies
is taken for granted in a discourse.
As discussed in Romero & Han 2004 and Frana & Rawlins 2019, this dis-
course requirement need not be derived through an independent presupposition.
Instead, it can be derived through discourse requirements for the addition of meta-
conversational operators. Because at all’s presupposition comments on the attitude
holder’s ideal common ground, it is meta-conversational: it refers to the unfolding
conversation itself. Romero & Han (2004) propose an economy constraint that
prevents meta-conversational moves unless they are necessary:
(29) Principle of Economy: Do not use a meta-conversational move unless neces-
sary (to resolve epistemic conflict or to ensure Quality).
Here, quality refers to the Maxim of Quality, which states that an interlocuter
should assert a proposition only if she has at least indirect evidence that the proposi-
sentence’s “negative” meaning; at all does not, by itself, contribute additional negation. Under a
Frana & Rawlins-style account, then, at all’s truth conditions simply assert its proposition argument,
rather than negating it.
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tion is true. At all’s meta-conversational status means that its use must be justified to
resolve an epistemic conflict or to ensure quality, which in turns means that there
must be a conflict about whether at all’s proposition should be in the CG. Since at
all’s presupposition indicates that the attitude holder believes that the proposition
should not be in the CG, the conflict must be derived from the fact that other dis-
course participants believe the opposite: that the proposition should be in the CG. At
all, therefore, licenses an inference that the proposition was already in the CG.
3.3 Problems with the traditional account
This denotation for CG at all also goes a fairly long way to capture at all’s distribution
as an NPI. At all’s conditions for use require that, according to a perspective holder’s
conversational goals, the proposition should not be in the CG. In a plain affirmative
sentence, this generally leads to a contradiction: the speaker asserts a proposition,
which suggests that the proposition should, according to the speaker, be added to the
CG, contrary to at all’s presupposition.
While the addition of CG at all to a run-of-the-mill assertion generally results
in a very odd and contradictory meaning, this is not necessarily true for all UE
environments. In order for a Frana & Rawlins-style approach to CG at all to be
adequate, it must predict that CG at all should be unacceptable in all contexts that
do not license NPIs. The question, then, is whether it is possible to generate a UE
sentence and a discourse context that allow for both the asserted content of the
sentence and CG-at all’s presupposition to be satisfied. The example below attempts
to provide such a sentence.
(30) Context: Emily and Sarah are discussing a grandfather clock. Sarah takes it
for granted that the clock is a handmade antique.
Sarah: It’s so cool that this grandfather clock was handmade!
Emily: Well, it’s possible that the clock was handmade (#at all). I wouldn’t
take it for granted. . .
In (30), the addition of CG at all renders the sentence unacceptable. However,
under the story for CG at all presented above, it’s not clear why. At all’s presupposi-
tion requires that the speaker believes that the proposition the clock was handmade
should not be in the common ground in an ideal conversation. This presupposition
is met, since Emily does not take it for granted that the clock was handmade, and
doesn’t want the other discourse participants to take it for granted either. At all’s
meta-conversational implicature should also be met, since the discourse participants
take the proposition the clock was handmade for granted. Despite this, the sentence
it’s possible that the clock was handmade at all is degraded. The fact that mono-
tonicity plays a key role in the licensing of CG at all is also supported by the fact
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that the sentence in (30) can be saved simply by changing the UE predicate possible
to the DE predicate unlikely.
3.4 A scalar approach to common ground management
One way to capture the parallelism between the two at alls—and perhaps other
dual degree modifiers and CG operators—might be to assume that both derive their
NPI distribution in the same way. If modification of the common ground could be
described using scales and degrees, like gradable adjectives and degree modifiers,
Chierchia’s approach to NPIs could then be extended to CG at all. Very informally,
CG at all might mean that the perspective holder has an extremely low degree of
commitment that a proposition should be in the common ground. A degree-based
approach would require shifting from universal quantification over worlds to degrees
on a scale.
There is intuitive support for such an analysis. A number of accounts of CG
operators reference degrees, even though their ultimate analysis uses only quantifica-
tion over worlds. Romero & Han (2004), for example, characterize CG management
as a perspective holder’s degree of certainty that a proposition should be added to
the CG. Beltrama (2018) goes further, discussing the connection between scalar
modifiers and CG management (as well as some of the problems with postulating an
isomorphism between the two).
The account I sketch out in the following section attempts to formalize what
Beltrama (2018) calls a possible shared “semantic kernel” between the lexical and
pragmatic uses of items like at all. This shared semantic kernel creates a parallelism
between degree modifiers and CG operators that might help explain why the two
are so often homophonous. However, this account does not suggest that all degree
modifiers can or will become CG operators, nor does it prevent CG operators from
having restrictions and semantic contributions above and beyond what would be
expected from their corresponding degree modifiers. It simply attempts to formalize
a shared semantic core between the two.
With this caveat aside, I present an account of common ground at all that treats
common ground modification as a scalar notion. In this account, a speaker’s belief
that a proposition should or should not be in the common ground is modeled with
degrees on a scale that I call “CG-goodnessx.”
CG-goodnessx is a scale that corresponds to the extent to which a given propo-
sition being in the common ground is consistent with a perspective holder’s con-
versational goals. It is anchored to x, the perspective holder. If a proposition p
has a higher degree of CG-goodnessx than a proposition q, p is more consistent
with x’s conversational goals than q. If p’s degree of CG-goodnessx is higher than
q’s, the perspective holder x would rather be in a conversation in which everyone
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believes p but not q than in a conversation in which everyone believed q but not p. A
very high degree of CG-goodnessx indicates that a proposition is consistent with x’s
conversational goals, while a low degree indicates that a proposition is inconsistent.
As in the account for at all sketched above, the perspective holder is the speaker
in ordinary assertions without attitude predicates. In contexts in which at all is
embedded under attitude predicates, however, at all’s pragmatic contribution is
anchored to the attitude holder.
3.5 Polarity-insensitive CG at all
Before moving on to the more complex case of NPI at all, I’ll illustrate how this
approach to CG operators could be applied to an imaginary polarity-insensitive at
all. While the examples I give below all embed this polarity-insensitive at all under
negation, there is nothing in the semantics so far that prevents it from occurring in
UE environments.
Informally, sentences with sentential negation and CG at all suggest that the atti-
tude holder does not think that there is the least degree of certainty that a proposition
p should be in the common ground. To capture this, polarity-insensitive CG-at all’s
denotation takes a proposition and sets that proposition’s degree of CG-goodness to
an (arbitrary) very low degree:
(31) [[polarity-insensitive CG at all]] = λp. λw. ∃d [verylow(d)∧CG-goodnessx(p)
≥ d in w]
This denotation states that there exists some degree d such that d is very low
and the CG-goodnessx of p according to x is greater than or equal to d in w. Again,
CG-goodnessx is a scale that corresponds to how well x’s conversational goals are
met given that a particular proposition is in the CG. Like with the traditional account
of CG management, this scalar at all also generates a meta-conversaional implicature
that the proposition in question was taken for granted in the CG: otherwise, a CG
management operator would not be licensed due to the Maxim of Quality. The
following example shows how this denotation works for a sentence with negation.
(32) Emily: Jane isn’t dead at all. LF: ¬ [[Jane is dead] at all]
Truth conditions: ¬ [ ∃d [ verylow(d) ∧ CG-goodnessEmily(Jane is dead) ≥ d
in w ]]
Paraphrase: It is not the case that there exists some degree d such that d is
very low and the degree of CG-goodness of the proposition Jane is dead
according to Emily is greater than or equal to d in w.
Meta-conversational implicature: Jane is dead was in the CG.
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3.6 Adapting Chierchia’s (2013) approach to CG at all
This approach to at all, however, does not capture at all’s status as an NPI. At
all’s NPI distribution can be captured in the same way as the NPI distribution of
degree modifier at all: by setting CG-goodness to an impossibly low degree and
exhaustifying, in the style of Chierchia 2013.
To account for CG at all in a manner that is consistent with degree modifier at
all, we need to set a minimum degree of “CG-goodnessx,” which I call dCG−min.
This is achieved in virtually the exact same way as it was for degree modifier at all.
The final denotation for dCG−min is the following:
(33) dCG−min = MAX{dCG−minset : dCG−minset < MIN ({d: ∃w’ ∈ ACCw. ∃x. ∃p.
CG-goodnessx(p) ≥ d ∧ ∀d’ [CG-goodnessx(p) ≥ d’→ d’ ≤ d]})}
In this denotation, we first pick out the set of degrees that correspond to the
maximal degrees to which CG-goodness is expressed by any proposition, by any
individual, in any accessible world. Then, we pick out the minimum of this set of
degrees: the absolute minimum amount of CG-goodness that any proposition could
have, according to any individual in any accessible world, without also having higher
degrees of CG-goodness. This step is shown in bold above. Finally, the function
picks out a degree that is even lower than this minimum degree. The highest degree
among a set of lower degrees is selected, though any of these lower degrees would
work just as well.
Like degree modifier at all, CG at all also comes with a set of alternatives and
an obligatory covert even operator. I assume that the even operator attaches high in
the syntax, scoping over the rest of the sentence. The alternatives for CG at all are
the following:
(34) [[ALT CG at all]]x = {λp. λw. CG-goodnessx(p) ≥ d’ in w: d’ ≥ dCG−min}
In these alternatives, the degree argument of CG-goodness is set to degrees
higher than dCG−min. Just as in the case of degree modifier at all, these alternatives
in concert with the covert even operator lead to a contradiction in UE environments.
The covert even operator requires the proposition with at all to be less likely than
its alternatives. In DE sentences, all of the alternatives are entailed by the original
sentence: if it is not the case that a proposition’s CG-goodness is set to less than
the minimum possible degree, this entails that it’s not the case that the proposition’s
CG-goodness is set to any higher degrees. In affirmative sentences, however, there is
a problem. In affirmative environments, the original sentence is in fact entailed by
all of the alternatives, which are stronger and less likely. The covert even operator’s
second conjunct is never satisfied, generating a contradiction.
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3.7 Embedded environments and attachment ambiguity
In the following section, I will show how this account of CG at all can be applied to
a sentence in which at all’s attachment is ambiguous. CG at all, as an NPI, must
attach below negation. At the same time, it takes a propositional argument, attaching
at the vP level. When a sentence contains multiple vPs, CG at all may modify either
one, provided that both occur in a DE environment. For example, the following
sentence contains two vPs, both of which are in a DE environment:
(35) Jane doesn’t think that Emily is dead at all.
LF: NEG [Jane thinks that [Emily is dead]]
(35) is ambiguous with respect to at all’s attachment. At all may attach to the
lower, embedded proposition, Emily is dead, which occurs entirely within the DE
environment created by sentential negation in the matrix clause. However, at all
may also attach to the matrix clause vP, which includes the proposition Jane thinks
that Emily is dead. This proposition also falls within the DE environment created
by the matrix clause’s sentential negation. Depending on where at all attaches,
different meanings are generated. Importantly, at all is anchored to the attitude
holder within the scope of an attitude verb, and to the speaker otherwise. (36) shows
the LF and truth conditions for at all’s lower attachment at the level of the embedded
proposition, for which at all is anchored to the attitude holder Jane.
(36) LF: Covert-even [NEG [Jane thinks that [[Emily is dead] at all]]]
Truth conditions (excluding even’s contribution): ¬ Jane thinks that [CG-
goodnessJane(Emily is dead) ≥ dCG−min in w]
Paraphrase: It’s not the case that Jane thinks that the proposition Emily is
dead being in the CG meets her (Jane’s) conversational goals to the least
degree.
(37) shows the LF and truth conditions for at all’s higher attachment at the matrix
proposition. Here, at all is anchored to the speaker, since its higher attachment means
that it is no longer within the scope of an attitude verb:
(37) LF: [Covert-even [NEG [[Jane thinks that that Emily is dead] at all]]]
Truth conditions (excluding even’s contribution): ¬ [CG-goodness-functionthe−speaker(Jane
thinks that Emily is dead) ≥ dCG−min in w]
Paraphrase: It’s not the case that the proposition Jane thinks that Emily is
dead being in the CG meets the speaker’s conversational goals to the least
degree.
In (36) above, with lower attachment, at all’s contribution suggests that Jane,
the attitude holder, does not believe that Emily is dead should be in the CG. In (37),
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at all attaches to the proposition in the matrix clause, I think that Emily is dead,
below sentential negation. Its contribution suggests that the attitude holder—this
time the speaker—does not believe that the entire proposition I think that Emily
is dead should be in the common ground. The disputed addition to the common
ground is now about the speaker’s beliefs, not about Emily’s death. From the English
speakers I have consulted, this ambiguity is a correct prediction.
3.8 At all in questions
In questions, I assume that at all’s perspective holder, x, is anchored not to the
speaker but rather to the listener or interlocutor. Consider the following example:
(38) Emily, to Jane: Is this fish dead at all?
LF: [+Q [this fish is dead] [at all]]
Here, CG-goodness within at all’s denotation will be anchored to Jane, not to
Emily. Substituting the proposition this fish is dead for p, and adding Jane as the
attitude holder, derives the following:
(39) [[CG-at all]]([[this fish is dead]])(w) = CG-goodnessJane(this fish is dead) ≥
dCG−min in w
The end result will be a question in which Emily asks Jane whether Jane has even
the least degree of comfort with the proposition this fish is dead being in the common
ground. As always, at all’s meta-conversational status generates an inference that
the proposition this fish is dead was already taken for granted.
3.9 Presuppositional vs. at-issue content
One key feature of the account sketched above is that at all modifies truth conditions
rather than introducing a presupposition. The fact that at all modifies truth conditions
is not simply an ancillary component to the account, but rather a core assumption.
This is because the denotation for at all is designed to work within sentences that
include DE operators like negation. In order for CG at all to yield correct truth
conditions, it must interact with the sentence’s DE operator. If, on the other hand, at
all contributed a presupposition, as in the Frana & Rawlins style account, we would
not expect its contribution to interact with DE operators in the way that it does.
The assumption that at all modifies truth conditions, however, is one that has
potentially worrisome consequences. Propositions modified by at all no longer
directly assert truth conditions; rather, they assert that, according to a speaker or
perspective holder, there is an extremely low degree of confidence for adding the
content of the proposition to the common ground.
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One possible way to remedy this problem might be to change the denotation
for CG at all to add disjunction, asserting the proposition p or the truth conditions
related to p’s status in the common ground:
(40) [[Revised CG at all]] = λp. λw. p ∨ CG-goodnessx(p) ≥ dCG−min in w
Under negation, the proposition modified by at all must be false (according to the
attitude holder) and the attitude holder must believe that the proposition should not
be in the CG in order for the sentence as a whole to be true. This revised denotation
is also not without problems, though I leave this discussion for future work.
4 Conclusion and open questions
A number of open questions remain that are beyond the scope of this paper. I have
not elaborated on how, precisely, CG at all’s perspective holder is anchored to the
speaker or attitude holder in embedded clauses. There are also a few remaining
puzzles related to CG at all’s distribution. For example, it is not licensed in the
restrictors of universal and negative quantifiers, even though such environments are
DE. CG at all is also licensed with the negative quantifier no (e.g., no one), but not
with other DE quantifiers like few. This suggests that it may require a split scope
account of no one, attaching between no and a proposition. Finally, at all can also
occur with free choice any, as in I will eat any ice cream at all, a rather limited usage
that is not captured by either degree modifier or common ground at all.
All in all, I hope to have shown that a scalar version of common ground manage-
ment may be a viable way to both account for at all’s status as an NPI and to capture
a parallelism between common ground management operators and degree modifiers
within and across languages. This account can be extended to other common ground
management operators, especially ones that have a dual usage as degree modifiers.
For example, really can be accounted for by setting CG-goodness to a high, rather
than low, degree. A degree-based semantics for common ground management may
help account for the tendency of degree modifiers to be used as CG operators both
diachronically and synchronically.
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